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Managing NymBoxes for Identity and Tracking Protection
Abstract
Despite the attempts of well-designed anonymous com-
munication tools to protect users from tracking or iden-
tification, flaws in surrounding software (such as web
browsers) and mistakes in configuration may leak the
user’s identity. We introduce Nymix, an anonymity-
centric operating system architecture designed “top-to-
bottom” to strengthen identity- and tracking-protection.
Nymix’s core contribution is OS support for nym-
browsing: independent, parallel, and ephemeral web ses-
sions. Each web session, or pseudonym, runs in a
unique virtual machine (VM) instance evolving from a
common base state with support for long-lived sessions
which can be anonymously stored to the cloud, avoiding
de-anonymization despite potential confiscation or theft.
Nymix allows a user to safely browse the Web using var-
ious different transports simultaneously through a plug-
gable communication model that supports Tor, Dissent,
and a private browsing mode. In evaluations, Nymix con-
sumes 600 MB per nymbox and loads within 15 to 25 sec-
onds.
1 Introduction
Today’s Internet users must increasingly assume that by
default all of their online activities are tracked and that
detailed profiles of their identities and behaviors are being
collected by every Web site they visit [65], sold for mar-
keting purposes [17, 53], and ingested into mass surveil-
lance systems [59]. Users may wish to protect their on-
line activities from being tracked or linked with their real
identities, however, or to access the Internet under sev-
eral distinct roles, personas, or pseudonyms. Anonymity
and pseudonymity are desirable to many types of users,
from repressed minorities [66] and dissidents in authori-
tarian countries [46, 33], to women wishing to hide their
pregnancies from advertisers [30, 31], to celebrity authors
desiring “feedback under a different name” [73].
Anonymity protocols such as Tor [15], Dissent [76],
and Aqua [43] obscure a user’s network location, but
client-side weaknesses can break this anonymity. Web
sites may still be able to track the user via third-party
plug-ins that circumvent the anonymous channel [55, 22],
via browser fingerprints [19], employ software exploits
to “stain” the client for long-term tracking [56], or de-
anonymize users directly [27, 61]. Anonymity-oriented
Linux distributions such as Tails [68] and Whonix [75]
Figure 1: Nymix is a client OS architecture designed
to enable users to manage multiple roles in their online
life, and offer strong protections against their roles being
tracked or linked.
mitigate some risks, but leave to the user the error-prone
task of managing different online roles or pseudonyms.
Users can accidentally de-anonymize themselves by log-
ging in to a sensitive account from the wrong browser
window or otherwise neglecting to protect anonymity
even once [63], or by posting a photo without realizing
that the JPEG may contain GPS coordinates [52].
To address this need we present Nymix, the first OS ar-
chitecture designed to help users manage online roles, or
nyms, and to protect these nyms systematically from ac-
cidental or malicious linking. As illustrated in Figure 1,
Nymix aims to offer end-to-end isolation between nyms,
separating all client-side state and browser activity related
to each nym into protected virtual machines, or nymboxes.
Nymix connects these nymboxes to the Internet only via
separate instances of network tracking protection systems,
such as Tor, protecting nyms from being linked by the on-
line services they are used to access.
Nymix enables and encourages users to create
ephemeral, “throwaway” nymboxes on demand for activ-
ities requiring no long-term state, such as reading news,
reducing the user’s vulnerability to long-term tracking or
intersection attacks [40]. Users can also create persistent
nymboxes when needed, which can remember long-lived
state such as login credentials for pseudonymous Inter-
net accounts. Unlike common password managers [1],
Nymix maintains and structurally enforces an explicit
binding between each role a user plays online, the net-
work login credentials related to each role, and all client-
side state such as browser history related to each role. By
binding client state and credentials to nymboxes, Nymix
reduces the user’s risk of accidentally entering credentials
in the wrong context or browser window – when using the
correct nymbox the user need not enter those credentials
at all.
Like Tails [68], Nymix can boot from a USB drive for
easy deployability and avoids leaving any history trail on
the host machine, offering deniability in situations where
installing anonymity tools may be dangerous or impossi-
ble. Nymix encrypts and saves persistent nymbox state
to either local media or anonymous cloud storage. By
default, Nymix updates nym state only at explicit user re-
quest (e.g., after the first login), and not after every brows-
ing session, to protect the user from staining attacks on
the nymbox’s state, adding further deniability and history
protection if the nym is ever compromised.
Nymix has been under development for the past two
years, predating public knowledge that governments use
malware to track [56] and de-anonymize users [27, 61],
two key attack vectors that Nymix’s design addresses.
Throughout its development, the prototype has undergone
regular design review and adversarial testing by an in-
dependent red-team. The prototype is based on Ubuntu
14.04, and uses two QEMU/KVM virtual machines for
each nymbox: one to run communication tools such as
Tor, and the other for the Web browser and associated
plugins. Nymix supports multiple pluggable anonymous
communication systems including Tor, Dissent, and a
lightweight incognito mode that imposes minimal over-
head but does not protect against network-level tracking.
Our experimental results show that Nymix offers simi-
lar performance to running the software natively or in sim-
ilar software distributions, such as Tails. Nymix unsur-
prisingly requires significantly more memory, however, as
each nymbox runs two virtual machines with all file sys-
tem writes stored in RAM.
This paper’s key contributions are: (1) an operating sys-
tem architecture designed to help users keep local and
online state related to different roles isolated and pro-
tected from tracking or linking; (2) a composable frame-
work supporting pluggable anonymity tools, (4) anony-
mous quasi-persistent nym storage either locally or in the
cloud, (3) user-directed sanitization to control information
leaks across nyms, and (5) the ability to launch the user’s
installed OS as a nym for deniability and history protec-
tion.
Section 2 identifies key challenges for anonymity and
pseudonymity. Section 3 presents Nymix’s trust model
and architecture. Section 4 describes our prototype imple-
mentation and our experiences with it. Section 5 evaluates
how well our architecture and prototype handle challenges
mentioned earlier. Section 6 discusses related work. Sec-
tion 7 reflects on other challenges and future work, and
Section 8 concludes.
2 Background and Motivation
This section motivates Nymix, and outlines the key chal-
lenges it attempts to address, via two fictional scenarios.
In the People’s Republic of Tyrannistan, the state-
controlled ISP monitors all users’ traffic to censor and
suppress dissent. Bob, a Tyrannistani dissident well
aware of these dangers, uses Tor [15] at night to organize
protests via his pseudonymous Twitter account [46, 33].
Bob spends his days at the state-run newspaper, using
his laptop to grind out grandiloquent paeans to Glorious
Leader Tyrannistanus Rex IV. Bob may face imprison-
ment if the censorware his job requires detects evidence
of unapproved activities on his laptop’s hard disk. Bob
therefore runs Tor only from a Tails USB drive [68].
Bob could still be de-anonymized in many ways unless
he is unerringly cautious. Since Tails (deliberately) for-
gets all state after each session, Bob habitually logs into
his Twitter account anew each night – but if by force of
habit he even once accidentally enters his Twitter creden-
tials while not running Tails, he may be caught [63]. Bob’s
computer and his Web activity [19, 23] produce unique
fingerprints. Using an intersection attack [40], Tyran-
nistani police can link Bob to his pseudonymous Twit-
ter account. Bob might take a photo with his smartphone
at a protest and post it to his Twitter feed via Tor, not
realizing that the EXIF metadata in the photo contains
GPS coordinates and his smartphone’s serial number [52].
Even if Bob makes no such mistakes, the Tyrannistani po-
lice might obtain a zero-day exploit, and use it against
Bob’s browser to inject malware onto his running system,
which reports his true IP and MAC address to the author-
ities [27, 61].
To improve his browsing experience, Bob begins exper-
imenting with Tails’ persistent state that stores passwords,
account settings, and applications on the same USB de-
vice as Tails. Unfortunately for Bob, this opens him up
to new types of staining [56] or fingerprinting, such as
the evercookie [38] that sticks around even if you disable
cookies. In addition, the USB device now becomes evi-
dence of Bob’s misbehavior. Tyrannistan police can con-
fiscate the device, coerce Bob to decrypt its contents, and
then de-anonymize him.
Life is easier for Alice in Freetopia: she does not feel in
any imminent danger, and is doing nothing she thinks the
Freetopian Fuzz care about. She has made some personal
choices that she is not ashamed of, and likes to discuss
online in appropriate forums, but which she imagines her
boss and work colleagues might not understand [66]. She
is also concerned that the web sites she visits, and the ads
they present her, seem to know more about her than her
own family does. She worries that these web sites might
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Figure 2: Block diagram of Nymix architecture. The
hypervisor hosts one or more nyms. Each nym has an
AnonVM for browsing Web content by communicating
through the CommVM, which hosts the anonymizer. The
SaniVM offers sanitized access to local disks by sharing
content scrubbed of personal information to AnonVMs.
“out” her unannounced pregnancy by sending a stream
of diaper ads while her family is around [30]. She finds
that the only way to keep such personal information secret
is using cloak-and-dagger methods that might themselves
raise suspicions of criminal activity [31]. Thus, although
Alice does not think anyone is “after her,” she would pre-
fer to enforce a strong and inviolate barrier between her
online activities related to her work, her family and social
life, and her unannounced preparations for motherhood.
3 Nymix Architecture
This section outlines the Nymix architecture, how it binds
pseudonyms to client-side and network state and protects
nyms from being linked, and how Nymix addresses the
challenges discussed above in Section 2.
3.1 Architecture Overview
Nymix is designed from the ground up to offer users
strong identity and tracking protection by giving them ex-
plicit, first-class control over pseudonyms representing the
multiple roles or personas they may use online. In con-
trast with the large body of existing work attempting to
improve security or isolation between distinct users, or be-
tween applications run by a single user, Nymix is the first
client OS we are aware of to establish strong separation
of roles through pseudonyms as a primary OS design ob-
jective. Nymix places supervisory control over VM cre-
ation, longevity, and destruction under the control of the
user, binding all client-side application state to a particular
nym via a nymbox. To protect the ownership and relation-
ships between different nymboxes, Nymix employs both
anonymizers such as Tor and Dissent to protect against
network-level linkage, and giving the user a full-featured
network client with the context of each nym, but deliber-
ately making it difficult for the user to link nyms acciden-
tally by posting the wrong file or cut-and-paste between
the wrong windows.
With Nymix, for example, Alice may instantiate a nym
to browse and check her e-mail, optionally loading the
encrypted nym’s state anonymously from a cloud storage
system to avoid leaving a “footprint” on her local ma-
chine. During this process, she wants to check the lat-
est news on Twitter and instantiates another nym, which
Nymix works to keep unlinkable to the first. Finally, she
wishes to post some content to her pseudonymous blog,
doing that via yet another nym. She might discard the
state of some nyms after each session, to protect her more
sensitive activities from long-term tracking and intersec-
tion attacks [40], while preserving the state of other nyms
locally or in cloud storage.
As shown in Figure 2, Nymix’s most crucial compo-
nent is its Nym Manager, which manages nyms and sepa-
rates all client-side browsing and other activities into sep-
arate virtual machines or nymboxes for each nym. Each
nymbox in fact represents two virtual machines. All nor-
mal client-side activity – such as running web browsers,
their plug-ins, and other network-connected applications
such as mail clients – is confined to the appropriate
nym’s AnonVM. Nymix treats the guest OS and processes
in each AnonVM as untrusted and potentially compro-
mised [56, 27, 61], and for this reason permits no interac-
tion between the AnonVM and the “outside world” except
via the nym’s corresponding CommVM. In this CommVM
reside anonymity and circumvention tools, or anonymiz-
ers such as Tor, which ensure that interaction between
the AnonVM and the Internet is further protected from
network-based tracking.
By isolating each nym’s AnonVM from its CommVM,
Nymix ensures that software exploits against the
AnonVM cannot compromise anonymity or link nyms
without also compromising the VMM. Launching a sep-
arate CommVM for each nym with an independent in-
stance of the anonymizer, in turn, ensures that even an
anonymizer compromise in one nym will (hopefully) not
compromise other nyms. Separating CommVMs also en-
sure that anonymizer state that is commonly shared or
reused for efficiency, such as Tor circuits, cannot acciden-
tally reveal the links between different nyms.
NymBoxes have no access to local storage, i.e., the lo-
cal hard disk and USB devices. To safely access personal
data, Nymix employs a SaniVM to isolate the user’s data
to a single non-networked environment. The SaniVM san-
itizes user data by either automatic or manual scrubbing
of personally identifiable material from this data before
making it available to an AnonVM.
3.2 Threat Model
Nymix’s threat model assumes that an adversary may be
able to compromise software within a particular AnonVM
or CommVM, install software and inject software ex-
ploits, and even gain root access within the VMs. How-
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ever, Nymix assumes the adversary cannot access the hy-
pervisor of a compromised VM nor the host’s file sys-
tems. While state-level attackers most likely can compro-
mise common VMMs including those Nymix uses [62],
we do not set the unrealistic expectation of making com-
promise impossible, but rather attempt to raise the barrier
and cost to attackers significantly. We hope eventually
Nymix could be implemented in a certified kernel/VMM
framework [41, 28], further increasing this barrier.
As the CommVM hosts only anonymizing software
such as Tor, an adversary can compromise a CommVM
only by attacking an anonymizer directly. Through a com-
promised CommVM, the adversary may learn Nymix’s
public IP address. While the AnonVM may be compro-
mised through remote exploits, the CommVM prevents
anything in the AnonVM from learning the user’s IP ad-
dress or other network or physical location information, so
long as the anonymizer in the CommVM is not also com-
promised. A compromised AnonVM or CommVM can-
not trivially be linked to other AnonVMs or CommVMs
on the same host; however, attacks may be performed us-
ing timing attacks and side channels [79, 80].
Nymix cannot protect users who obtain compromised
copies of Nymix itself, leaving the important problem
of secure software distribution out of scope. We as-
sume users obtain copies of Nymix through trustworthy
sources or verify their authenticity prior to use. Nymix
also does not improve the anonymity provided by the
anonymizer, nor can Nymix prevent a user from explic-
itly de-anonymizing themselves by typing their real name
into an AnonVM for example.
3.3 Anonymizers and CommVMs
Anonymizers such as Tor typically act as client-side Web
proxies that redirect TCP connections through relays to
hide their source. If the Web browser connected to this
client-side proxy is misconfigured or vulnerable, how-
ever, an adversary can exploit that vulnerability to bypass
the anonymizer: for example by invoking a plug-in that
fails to respect the browser’s proxy settings [55, 22], or
by using malware to directly read and report the user’s
IP address [27, 61]. Like Whonix [75], Nymix sepa-
rates anonymizers from the user’s potentially vulnerable
Web browsing environment via two separate virtual ma-
chines – an AnonVM and a CommVM, respectively. Un-
like Whonix, which provides only a static user-managed
pair of VM images, Nymix’s Nym Manager dynamically
launches and manages AnonVMs and CommVMs and
manages their state as part of a user-controlled nymbox.
The user operates a nym primarily via the AnonVM,
in which the web browser and other applications such
as E-mail clients run. Each AnonVM has a single vir-
tual network link that connects directly, and only to, a
CommVM, which runs an instance of the anonymizer for
this nym. The CommVM redirects all AnonVM traffic to
the anonymizer, which in turns transmits traffic through
the anonymity network via the CommVM’s NAT-based
Internet connection. No software in the AnonVM ever
gets access to the physical host machine’s IP address,
MAC address, or other physical devices or their trackable
device identifiers.
Alternative Anonymizers: Nymix treats the
anonymizer as a pluggable module, and offers the
user a choice of several alternative anonymizers pre-
configured to address different security/performance
tradeoffs. A lightweight incognito mode uses simple
VPN relaying to provide low-cost anonymization with
weak security. For more sensitive activities the user
can employ Tor, which offers excellent scalability and
good security against moderate adversaries. Finally,
Nymix experimentally supports anonymous browsing
via Dissent [76], an anonymizer based on DC-nets [11]
that in principle offers formally provable traffic analysis
resistance and systematic protection against intersection
attacks [77], but is less mature and currently less scalable
than Tor. In principle, anonymizers can be combined
by connecting CommVMs in serial, or within the same
CommVM: we have built experimental Nymix configura-
tions combining Tor and Dissent to achieve “best of both
worlds” anonymity, for example.
While many modern browsers offer incognito or pri-
vate browsing modes that promise to erase cookies, his-
tory, and other state after a session, a single state manage-
ment bug or security vulnerability in the browser can nev-
ertheless render the user trackable [3]. Even in Whonix,
such a state management bug – or malware-based stain
attack [56] – renders the statically administered browser
VM permanently trackable, and hence vulnerable to long-
term intersection attacks, unless the user manually rein-
stalls Whonix or resets it to pristine VM images. By
isolating both the browser and any such stains in a dy-
namically managed AnonVM as part of an ephemeral-by-
default nym, Nymix ensures that trackable stains disap-
pear immediately when the nym does.
3.4 Creating and Configuring NymBoxes
One of Nymix’s goals is to be small enough for users to
download conveniently and run from a typical USB drive,
like Tails, to support users who wish to leave no trace of
their sensitive Internet access activities on their comput-
ers. A key practical challenge Nymix’s VM-centric de-
sign presents, however, is that we effectively need to fit
the equivalent of at least three different VM images on the
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same USB drive: one containing the host OS atop which
Nymix is built (currently Ubuntu Linux), the second con-
taining an initial disk image for AnonVMs to use (contain-
ing the web browser and other applications), and the third
containing an initial disk image for CommVMs to use
(containing Tor or other anonymizers). Supporting multi-
ple alternative anonymizers as discussed above might fur-
ther increase the number of VM images that Nymix would
need to “ship with.”
To address this challenge, Nymix uses the OS image
installed on the Nymix USB as the host OS from which
the hypervisor/VMM boots, as well as the basic VM im-
age for all AnonVMs and CommVMs. To differentiate
these OS images to serve their distinct roles at runtime,
Nymix employs union file systems, which logically stack
multiple file systems together while merging their con-
tents. The union file system responds to file read accesses
with the contents of that file as it exists in the top most
stack. The file system stores writes into the top most read-
write layer, shielding lower layers from write access using
copy-on-write.
Live-bootable operating systems such as Tails often use
union file systems with the top layer using a temporary file
system that resides in RAM. Nymix inserts between the
base image and the temporary file system an additional,
intermediary configuration file system containing the con-
figuration necessary to start the particular VM – e.g., one
configuration file system for its standard AnonVM con-
figuration, and a separate configuration file system for
the CommVM representing each alternative anonymizer
Nymix supports. The changes this configuration file sys-
tem makes include the network configuration files, the lo-
cal startup script (/etc/rc.local), and the window manager
startup script.
A nymbox’s temporary file systems store all writes
to the file system in RAM. As a result, turning off a
pseudonym results in amnesia – Nymix wipes any traces
that the pseudonym ever existed and securely erases the
AnonVM’s and CommVM’s memory immediately on
shutting down a pseudonym. The USB device used during
a Nymix session remains unchanged, ensuring that even if
confiscated and thoroughly analyzed neither the computer
nor the USB device harbors evidence of Nymix use.
After terminating a nym, Nymix removes all state of
that nym from memory. As designed, Nymix and all other
existing production solutions retain traces of that state un-
til reboot; however, because the hypervisor cannot be ac-
cessed without live confiscation, such state is likely to be
inaccessible by an adversary. Recent work by Dunn [18]
explores how much information remains on a host after
a virtual machine has shut down, yet the hypervisor re-
mains active, as well as various methods for eliminating
it. Nymix could employ these methodologies to address
adversaries with physical access; however, many of these
features require specialized hardware and additional com-
putational overhead, so for now we assume that erasing
AnonVM and CommVM memory after shutdown are suf-
ficient.
One security concern, created by Nymix’s reuse of the
host OS partition as AnonVM and CommVM images, is
that Nymix must ensure that the host OS partition is al-
ways mounted read-only and never modified for any rea-
son. This implies that any state the user wishes to persist
across boots – such as persistent nyms, as described below
– must be stored elsewhere, either on different local disks
or USB drives or in cloud storage. If Nymix ever permit-
ted the host OS partition to be modified from its standard
“distribution” state, those modifications, however minute
(even mount-time or access-time updates) would mani-
fest in the initial states of all AnonVMs subsequently cre-
ated, potentially offering adversaries a way to track the
user. While Nymix by construction ensures that its host
partition is only ever mounted read-only, it cannot pre-
vent other operating systems from mounting the partition
read/write and potentially modifying it while the USB
drive is plugged in. Although not yet implemented, we in-
tend to address this risk by adding a mechanism to check
all disk blocks loaded from the host OS partition into
an AnonVM or CommVM against a well-known Merkle
tree [26] as they are accessed, and safely shut down rather
than risk vulnerability if a modified block is detected.
3.5 Quasi-Persistent Nyms
Although ideal from a tracking resistance perspective, a
pure amnesiac system that never maintains persistent state
across reboots would inhibit usability, effectively requir-
ing users to re-initialize all browser configuration pref-
erences during each session, and to re-enter login cre-
dentials for any pseudonymous Internet accounts the user
might wish to access during the session. Worse, client
OS amnesia can reduce the security of users who regu-
larly connect to pseudonymous accounts such as Alice’s
dissident Twitter feed in Tyrannistan, in at least two ways.
First, because Alice must enter her pseudonymous Twit-
ter username and password during each session, this pro-
cedure is likely to become habit – but if she ever even
once accidentally performs this procedure outside of an
anonymity-protected context (e.g., on some other Ubuntu
distribution she may sometimes run with a GUI look-and-
feel similar to Tails), she may be compromised [63, 45].
Second, state-of-the-art anonymizers like Tor are more se-
cure if they can maintain some state across boots – in
particular, Tor normally maintains the same entry relay
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for several months – and may increase this period fur-
ther [14, 20]. Users whose pseudonymous actions are
linkable (e.g., via Alice’s twitter feed) are inherently vul-
nerable to long-term intersection attacks, which the at-
tacker can exploit far more rapidly if Tor chooses new
entry relays frequently [36]. Thus, if Alice uses a pure
amnesiac system to post to her Twitter feed, Tor is forced
to choose a new entry relay each time she boots, greatly
increasing her vulnerability to intersection attacks.
Both to offer convenience by enabling users to maintain
content such as bookmarks, usernames and passwords,
and application preferences, and to ensure that related
anonymizer state is also preserved for security, Nymix
supports quasi-persistent data. Quasi-persistent data re-
sides on the machine only when actively in use. When not
in use, an encrypted copy of the data is migrated to an-
other storage device – either to another local partition or
USB drive, or to the cloud, akin to CleanOS [70]. Nymix
allows users to store information and data accumulated
during a pseudonym session anonymously into the cloud,
thus retaining pseudonym information while leaving no
potentially “suspicious” state (even encrypted) on local
devices that might be inspected or confiscated.
Nymix supports three different nym usage models: am-
nesiac/ephemeral, persistent, and pre-configured. The lat-
ter two both make use of quasi-persistent data, but with
different intent. In persistent mode, Nymix updates the
nym’s stored state after each session, presenting a famil-
iar and convenient state management model but increase
risk that the effects of a stain or other exploit attack in one
browsing session will persist for the lifetime of the nym.
In pre-configured mode, a user boots a nym once, con-
figures it with appropriate software, settings, bookmarks,
pseudonymous account credentials, and any other useful
state, then directs Nymix to snapshot the nym. Each sub-
sequent use of this nym then starts from this snapshot,
never updating the stored nym state unless the user ex-
plicitly requests another snapshot. Thus, a malware in-
fection affecting one browsing session will be scrubbed at
the user’s next session, and even if the nym’s state is even-
tually compromised, the attacker obtains no record of the
user’s client-side activities using the nym.
Workflow: In a typical workflow, Nymix on boot
presents the user with a Nym Manager, offering options
to start a fresh nym or load an existing nym. On first
use, the user selects start a fresh nym. Each new nym
begins with a writable virtual disk image in a standard,
pristine state. When done browsing, if the user opts to
store his nym, he returns to the Nym Manager and selects
store nym. The user enters a name for the nym, a pass-
word to encrypt it with, and an indication of a cloud ser-
vice on which to store the nym. The Nym Manager navi-
gates the user to the cloud service, using the CommVM’s
anonymizer to protect this connection, and prompts the
user to login to the cloud service. In the background, the
nym manager pauses the nym’s AnonVM and CommVM,
syncs their file systems, compresses and encrypts their
temporary file system disk images, resumes the VMs, and
uploads the contents through the nym’s CommVM. The
nym manager notifies the user once the nym has been
saved, after which the user may close the nym or turn off
the computer.
Later the user returns to Nymix and selects load an ex-
isting nym. While the Nym Manager prompts the user
to select the cloud service hosting the nym, Nymix starts
an ephemeral nym for the purpose of gathering the nym’s
state anonymously from the selected service. As before,
the nym manager directs the user to the cloud service’s
login page, and then prompts the user for the name of the
nym and the decryption password. In the background, the
nym manager downloads the nym’s state, and terminates
the ephemeral nym used for downloading. The nym man-
ager then proceeds to decrypt and decompress the loading
nym’s CommVM and AnonVM images, and resumes the
nym by starting a new set of VMs using these images. The
user may then continue using the nym.
Security Tradeoffs: The cloud storage solution has the
advantage of offering plausible deniability to a user whose
devices or USB drives may be inspected or confiscated.
By utilizing free-to-use cloud storage options, such as
DropBox or Google Drive, a user can create a pseudony-
mous cloud account for each pseudonym. Because all
interactions with the cloud storage are anonymized, the
cloud provider learns nothing about the account owner.
Similarly, as pseudonyms store only encrypted data, cloud
providers learn nothing about the pseudonym therein.
One subtle downside of the cloud approach is that the
ephemeral CommVM used to load a nym from the cloud
cannot use the nym’s “proper” CommVM state – such as
Tor entry guards – because that CommVM state has not
been retrieved yet. While we do not expect it to be easy
for an attacker to correlate the loading of the nym’s state
through the ephemeral CommVM with the user’s actions
using the nym’s own stateful CommVM, a sufficiently
powerful and all-seeing attacker might in principle do so,
making this ephemeral CommVM one remaining point of
vulnerability to long-term intersection attacks. One solu-
tion is for the user simply to use local storage instead of
the cloud. Another possible solution we are exploring is to
seed critical CommVM state such as entry guard choices
using a deterministic hash based on the nym’s storage lo-
cation and password, ensuring that the same seed (and
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hence same entry guard choices) get used even by the
ephemeral CommVM that load the nym.
3.6 Sanitized File Transfers
Users may want to distribute content from non-
anonymous sources – e.g., Bob wants to post pictures he
took on his digital camera of the day’s protests in Tyranni-
men Square. Naı¨vely posting such files are risky, as they
may leak the user’s identity via GPS coordinates in EXIF
metadata for example [8, 10, 52].
To mitigate such risks, Nymix never gives a nymbox
direct access to files on the client machine’s installed OS.
Instead, Nymix delegates this responsibility to a dedi-
cated, non-networked sanitation VM or SaniVM. Within
this SaniVM, the user can access files on the installed OS
and transfer files between nyms, via scrubbing tools that
assist the user in transferring files safely.
Upon boot, Nymix searches the computer for file sys-
tems unrelated to Nymix and mounts them in the SaniVM.
Within this SaniVM the user can browse through all
files on the computer and select files for transfer into
a nymbox. Prior to making any data accessible in the
nymbox, however, the SaniVM launches a suite of scrub-
bing tools that inspect the files to be transferred, attempt
to identify potential risks such as hidden metadata or vis-
ible faces in photos, present the user a list of these files
and potential risks, and offer to apply appropriate scrub-
bing transformations under control of the user to remove
potentially identifying personal information.
Nymix creates a unique directory within the SaniVM
for each nym. The SaniVM detects when the user moves
files into this directory and launches the scrubbing work-
flow. Once scrubbing completes, the SaniVM finally
copies the file into a directory visible to the appropriate
nym’s AnonVM.
The SaniVM’s scrubbing process builds on the Meta-
data Anonymization Toolkit (MAT) [71], but Nymix adds
atop MAT both additional anonymization methods and
a more user-friendly workflow incorporating automated
risk analysis and identification, enabling the user to se-
lect among alternative transformations, which might be
seen as corresponding to different “paranoia levels.” With
images, for example, the user might choose any combi-
nation of: (a) scrub EXIF or other metadata, (b) blur any
detectable faces using OpenCV [2], and/or (c) reduce the
resolution and add noise in attempt to disrupt any water-
marks the image might contain unbeknownst to the user.
With PDF or DOC files, the user can similarly scrub meta-
data, but also has the option to reconstruct the document
completely as a series of bitmaps, effectively scrubbing
any nonvisual information that might be concealed (acci-
dentally or intentionally) in document’s complex text or
vector graphics structures.
While Nymix builds on a wealth of existing techniques
to strip files of potentially identifying material [4, 6, 67,
71], clearly no scrubbing suite can be perfect. Develop-
ers continuously create new file types, and add extensions
to existing file types, which might conceal identifying in-
formation. Adversaries can also find improved ways to
exploit existing file types. Nevertheless, by designing
personal information detection, analysis, and scrubbing
into Nymix’s only cross-nym file transfer path, we hope
Nymix’s architecture will ensure that users are at least
made aware of the risks and offered choices that increase
safety in common-case situations.
3.7 Installed OS as a Nym
Even if a user boots Nymix from USB, he likely already
has a conventional OS installed on the machine, which he
may use for common non-sensitive, non-anonymous ac-
tivities. This installed OS is likely to have network-related
state such as WiFi passwords or VPN software the user
regularly employs to access local networks. To reduce
Nymix’s deployment burden and network configuration
effort required on startup, Nymix can boot the machine’s
installed OS in a (non-anonymous) nymbox, and lever-
age its existing state to sign onto relevant WiFi LANs, or
enable the user to find (or create) files on his installed sys-
tem that he may wish to transfer to nyms via the SaniVM,
using already-familiar applications on the installed OS.
Nymix can currently boot several versions of Windows
and Linux in this way.
The three keys challenges for installed OS nyms that
differ from traditional nyms are booting the OS in a VM,
addressing persistency, and specifying network configu-
ration parameters. While Linux usually boots without is-
sue, booting in a VM a Windows instance installed on the
“bare metal” can trigger device driver complaints. We
found that a standard repair process typically addresses
this problem, however.
A user’s installed OS may of course be compromised
with malware or censorware [42] that may attempt to track
or fingerprint the user. To maximize the safety of booting
the installed OS, Nymix treats the machine’s hard disk as
read-only and boots the installed OS into a copy-on-write
virtual disk, so that no changes the installed OS makes
while running under Nymix ever persist on the physical
disk it was booted from. This design: (a) ensures that
the user will not need to run a repair process again when
switching back to the installed OS on the bare metal; (b)
ensures that any other unexpected glitches caused by boot-
ing the installed OS in a VM cannot unexpectedly break
the installed OS image on the underlying disk; (c) avoids
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leaving any history indicating Nymix’s use on the local
disk, offer the user plausible deniability.
If a user needs persistence, he may explicitly allow
writes back to the physical disk, or store his copy-on-write
COW disk as quasi-persistent data. If he subsequently
starts his installed OS outside of Nymix, however, it may
need to be repaired again, as in the case of Windows. Fur-
ther, attempting to use the quasi-persistent COW disk af-
ter the underlying disk has changed can lead to inconsis-
tency or corruption. Thus, we consider it safest to treat the
installed OS as read-only, and leave exploration of more
sophisticated alternatives to future work.
4 Prototype Implementation
Our prototype Nymix systems implements the architec-
ture discussed in Section 3 including support for various
anonymizers, circumvention tools, and sanitization tech-
niques. Nymix uses the Ubuntu 14.04 64-bit Linux dis-
tribution and QEMU/KVM for running all nymboxes, be-
sides Windows Host OS nyms. We have yet to consol-
idate nym activity to a single interface; instead we use
the graphical user interface of each AnonVM to host the
nym’s Web browser. The Chromium Web browser was
chosen in order to support circumvention software, specif-
ically StegoTorus [74]. We have released Nymix source
code, packages that build a fresh Nymix disk image, and
Nymix images at blinded url.
4.1 Anonymizers and Circumvention Tools
Nymix has the necessary configuration to support
anonymizers, circumvention tools, and other communica-
tion tools that use either a SOCKS [44] or virtual network
interfaces, such as a tap device. The entire run-time con-
figuration for these tools resides within the CommVM,
running completely transparent to the AnonVM. While
Tor does not support UDP redirection, it has a built-in
DNS server. Dissent, on the other hand, does have sup-
port for UDP redirection. For tools that support neither,
Nymix would need to convert UDP-based DNS requests
to TCP before transmitting them over the communication
tool.
Currently, we have tested the following tools within
Nymix: Tor [15], Dissent [76], our own implementation
of SWEET [32], and an incognito mode. Tor has a built-
in DNS server, while both Dissent and SWEET support
UDP based proxying. Our incognito mode makes use of
Linux’ IPTables masquerade mode in order to provide a
NAT interface into the Internet.
4.2 Virtual Machine Management
For virtualization, Nymix primarily depends on
KVM [57], a virtualization solution built directly
into the Linux kernel. KVM builds upon and recently
merged with QEMU [5] and takes advantage of hardware
virtualization, where available.
The hypervisor configures the network on the AnonVM
to talk directly to the CommVM via a UDP port, effec-
tively setting a virtual wire connecting the two machines
or a host-only network. Because that UDP sockets run in
the hypervisor, only applications in the hypervisor can ac-
cess it. The CommVM connects to the Internet by way of
KVM user-mode NAT.
Nymix configures the VM to reduce the ability for an
adversary to fingerprint a VM. Each independent set of
AnonVMs and CommVMs have the same Ethernet and
IP addresses. The resolution within an AnonVM is con-
sistently set to 1024x768, albeit that is configurable up-
wards and downwards, we want Nymix to run the same
on every machine. Each VM has only a single CPU listed
in /proc/cpuinfo as a QEMU Virtual CPU. The VM has
256 MB writable storage and 256 MB RAM, both of these
consume the host’s RAM.
Nymix enables KSM or kernel samepage merging.
KSM is a memory-saving de-duplication feature that
scans pages and merges when applicable. Because all
Nymix VMs and the hypervisor use the same disk image
and hence applications, Nymix can save a bit of RAM
through the use of KSM, as we show in our evaluations.
Nymix stacks the file systems together using Over-
layFS, a union file system built directly into the Linux ker-
nel. Each VM has three file systems: 1) the base image,
2) a configuration image, 3) and a writable image. The
hypervisor and VMs all share a common base image, this
is the OS installed on the USB stick. The configuration
image masks configuration files on the base image to en-
able AnonVM, CommVM, or SaniVM functionality. The
writable image can either be tossed at the end of a session
or stored in the cloud for quasi-persistent data stores.
Many modern virtual machine management tools sup-
port loading a real path within the hosts file system
onto a guest. KVM makes use of VirtFS [37]. Within
Nymix each of the different configuration file systems ex-
ists as paths within the disk image. When starting the
pseudonym VMs, Nymix attaches the appropriate path to
the VM as a VirtFS.
4.3 Sanitized File Transfers
The SaniVM hosts a multipurpose scrubbing tool that we
designed. The scrubbing tool runs in two modes, the first
takes advantage of MAT [71], the Metadata Anonymisa-
8
tion Toolkit. The second mode converts the document into
a series of images, effectively loading the document into a
proper viewer, taking one or more screen shots, and then
assembling the images together. Both tools strip away
metadata; however, our extension does so by requiring
only a viewing tool and not a tool that has explicit knowl-
edge about what fields should be stripped. Of course, a
malicious entity may embed visible content that neither
stripper can remove.
After scrubbing, the SaniVM moves it into a shared
folder with the hypervisor. The hypervisor, then in
turn, moves it into a shared folder with the specific
AnonVM. KVM includes a shared folder technology
called VirtFS [37].
5 Evaluation
5.1 Validating the System
We validate the Nymix prototype using KVM and nested
virtualization This process made it easy to verify the state
of the system and inspect for potential information leaks.
To check for leaks, we connected the Nymix hypervisor to
a virtual network interface that tunneled traffic to a NAT
running on the host. On the host device, we ran Wire-
shark and inspected traffic entering and exiting an idle
Nymix client. The Nymix hypervisor emitted only traf-
fic for DHCP and anonymizer traffic, while the AnonVM
transmitted no traffic.
We also started many pseudonyms simultaneously in
order to verify the restricted communication model. We
attempted to transmit Ethernet and IP packets from one
AnonVM as well as one CommVM to the local network,
other AnonVMs and CommVMs, as well as the hypervi-
sor. All attempts failed with a no-response, as if the host
did not exist. The AnonVM can only communicate with a
functional CommVM and the CommVM could only com-
municate with the Internet not local intranets.
Beyond internal validation, Nymix has been regularly
scrutinized for over 2 years by an independent red-team.
5.2 Concurrent Nym Usage
As users explore the new functionality provided by
Nymix, there will be a natural increase in pseudonym us-
age. Each additional pseudonym costs RAM as well as in-
duces network and CPU overhead on other pseudonyms.
In this section, we investigate these overheads in a series
of experiments using an Intel I7 quad core desktop with
hardware virtualization extensions and 16 GB of RAM.
The desktop connects to a test Tor deployment running
on the DeterLab testbed that eventually reaches the real
Internet. The network connection between the DeterLab
testbed [13], has a round trip latency of 80ms and through-
put and has been rate limited to 10 Mbit/s through the
Linux tool qc, the DeterLab testbed has no additional de-
lays or bandwidth constraints. While we could use the real
Tor network, our evaluations focus on the overheads of
Nymix and not noise introduced by the dynamic and com-
plex nature of Tor. To analyze overheads, the VMs used
two different memory configurations. Our CPU bench-
mark, Peacemaker, demanded around 1 GB of RAM,
whereas, bandwidth and regular Web access required only
384 MB of RAM. In all tests, we allocated 16 MB disk
space and 128 MB RAM to each CommVM and 128 MB
disk space to each AnonVM. The host allocates disk and
RAM from its own stash of RAM, thus limiting the max-
imum number of nyms.
To evaluate memory per pseudonym, we launched a
series of pseudonyms in succession. Upon loading a
pseudonym, we checked the current used memory and
kernel samepage merging (KSM) shared pages. We then
interacted with a website and again noted the used mem-
ory and shared pages. At which point, we loaded another
pseudonym and repeated producing 8 different nyms. We
accessed the following websites in order: Gmail, Twitter,
Youtube, Tor Blog, BBC, Facebook, Slashdot, and ESPN.
Where applicable, we signed into Web sites and simulated
some typical user behaviors, such as reading the latest
news. Our results, Figure 3, show that KVM obtains most
of the requested memory for a VM at VM initialization
and not during run time. We also see that as more VMs
are allocated, KSM manages to reduces overall memory
usage resulting in over 5% saving at 8 nyms.
To evaluate CPU overhead, we ran a Javascript bench-
mark called Peacekeeper [25] in several pseudonyms, si-
multaneously. Unfortunately certain experiments with
Peacekeeper consume too much memory causing Chrome
to crash, therefore we had to increase the RAM allocated
to the AnonVM for this evaluation. We ran the evaluation
with up to 8 pseudonyms and present the results in Fig-
ure 4. In this graph, 0 represents the system running in
native mode. Virtualization incurs about a 20% overhead.
When running Peacemaker in parallel, the actual perfor-
mance outperforms the expected results, based upon the
single nyms performance when run multiple times per-
fectly in parallel with other nyms. These results indicate
that CPU performance overheads, while apparent, should
not be a significant impediment to Nymix scalability.
Each additional nym uses its own instance of an
anonymizer incurring additional bandwidth overhead due
to control messages. In this evaluation, we download the
current Linux kernel version 3.14.2, from a server running
within DeterLab in order to guarantee the 10 Mbit down-
load rate. We varied the number of parallel downloading
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nyms and present the results in Figure 5. As we scale the
number of nyms, the performance remains relatively lin-
ear, indicating that Tor, the anonymizer in the CommVM,
has a fixed cost, approximately 12% overhead. Perfor-
mance on the real Tor network may differ significantly.
5.3 Pseudonym Storage
To evaluate the storage requirements for quasi-persistent
pseudonyms, we monitored the size on disk of the nym
state across ten save/restore cycles over the course of three
days. Both the AnonVM and CommVM were equipped
with 256 MB disks. We performed the experiment with
four different nyms each visiting a different site: Twit-
ter, Facebook, Gmail, or the Tor Blog. We began by
launching a new pseudonym, visit the website, sign-in
when applicable, and configure the browser to remem-
ber login information. We then closed the browser and
saved the pseudonym to cloud storage. For all subsequent
measurements, we restored the nym from cloud storage
and launched the browser, triggering a fetch of any new
site updates. After the page finished loading, we closed
the browser, and, in the case of persistent nyms, saved
the pseudonym back to cloud storage. For each upload
we recorded the size on disk of the archived, encrypted
pseudonym image.
We present the results of our experiment in Figure 6.
Persistent nyms do grow over time with the AnonVM con-
tent accounting for 85% of the pseudonym size, though
much of that is dominated by contents in Chromium
cache, which could have been configured to be smaller
than the default of 83 MB. Effectively a single save cycle
represents usage similar to a pre-configured nym, which
tends to be small in the order of megabytes.
5.4 Pseudonym Restoration
To evaluate the overhead incurred by starting a fresh
nym and restoring a quasi-persistent nym, we compared
startup times for the three different nym usage mod-
els: ephemeral, pre-configured, and persistent. For each
configuration, we visited the Twitter website and re-
trieved updates. Upon finishing the page load, we closed
the browser and, in the first two models, discarded all
changes. For persistent nyms, we saved all changes back
to the persistent state. We further divided pseudonym
startup time into three phases: AnonVM boot time, Tor
startup time, and webpage load time. For quasi-persistent
nyms, we include the time it takes to start an ephemeral
nym, download the state from the cloud, decrypt it, and
prepare a new nym encapsulated as “Ephemeral Nym”
We timed five executions from each initial configuration
and present the averaged results in Figure 7. Quasi-
persistent nyms consistently outperform ephemeral nyms
due to stored Tor state; however, they require a one-time
use ephemeral nym to download the data as well as user
interaction necessary for authentication and nym selec-
tion, which was not measured in this evaluation. In prac-
tice, we expect user-interaction to play a significant role
in nym boot times.
5.5 Installed OS as a Nym
Running an installed OS as a nym requires both user inter-
action and computation resources. User interaction comes
in the form of a user executing commands to repair the OS
to support the change of hardware. The repair process an-
alyzes the OS state and performs some reconfiguration.
While hard to separate the human process from the auto-
mated process, this evaluation takes a look at both the time
required to perform this process and the resulting impact
on memory. Finally, after repairing the OS, the operating
system can be booted as a nym. We present the results
in Table 1. Memory sizes suggest that the repair process
is quite invasive, suggesting that perhaps there may be a
more intelligent means to automating this process. Ideally
we could automate the repairing of the OS in the back-
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ground, merging the time a repair takes with the booting
process of Nymix and the associated CommVM.
Repair (S) Boot (S) Size (MB)
Vista 133.7 37.7 4.9
7 129.3 34.3 4.5
8 157.0 58.7 14
Table 1: Time and memory costs of using various versions
of Windows as a nym in Nymix.
6 Related Work
The Nymix project bears resemblance to other safety-
focused bootable media projects. Tails [68] uses external
bootable devices which have been preconfigured with Tor,
the Tor version of Firefox, and other utilities for privacy
protection. Like Nymix, Tails supports persistent state;
however, Tails stores that state on the same USB as Tails.
Even if the data is encrypted, a sufficiently powerful ad-
versary could likely coerce the key from its owner. Nymix
offers deniability by storing persistent state anonymously
to the cloud. Because of the large community surround-
ing Tails, we view Nymix as a development platform for
research ideas that eventually will be integrated into Tails,
namely, structural protection such as nymboxes and quasi-
persistent data.
Like Nymix, Whonix [75] separates the user environ-
ment from the communication tool eliminating accidental
information leaks due to faulty component configurations.
Unlike Nymix, Whonix installs a pair of virtual machines
on the users installed operating system. Unlike Nymix,
Whonix cannot defend against hardware fingerprinting,
confiscation, or correlation attacks.
Similar to how Nymix isolates user data into a sin-
gle environment, the SaniVM, the US military [39] and
NSA [49] have made similar efforts to separate classified
and unclassified information. In fact, the US military’s ap-
proach to separation entitled “secure shared file store op-
tions” has a similar construction to Nymix’s use of VirtFS
without requiring changes to the hypervisor.
Nymix solves an important problem in the domain of
scrubbing, negligence in their use [8], by forcing their use
as part of an OS primitive Earlier work proposes similar
extensions for networks [35]. Nymix builds on MAT [71],
but there are many other tools out there and metadata
scrubbing may be insufficient. Even intentionally blinded
conference papers leak personally identifiable informa-
tion [4]. Bier [6] shows that removing keywords is in-
sufficient and need semantic analysis, in effect, nothing
will be perfect. Data may be hidden by steganography
and there is not much a scrubber can do to prevent active
steganography [10].
As an alternative to selecting files and folders to scrub,
Nymix could employ concepts introduced by User-Driven
Access Control [60]. In this model, a user could grant
access to certain folders and files on the host to a specific
nym. Nymix could then delay scrubbing of files until the
files have been accessed from within the nym.
The notion of pseudonyms long predates anonymous
digital communication. Recent work from Han et al. [29]
explores the notion of a pseudonym browsing mode. Their
work focuses on a network adversary who links users
primarily by IP addresses. To mitigate the effective-
ness of this adversary, each pseudonym runs in the same
OS but within different browser profiles and IPv6 ad-
dresses. Their approach requires infrastructure changes
to deployed IPv6 routers in order to support multiple IPv6
addresses at the same site that could not easily be corre-
lated, effectively creating a one hop proxy or a VPN. They
have also implemented a plugin to address adversaries
similar to Panopticlick [23]; however, this is an arms race
and the plugin will need to be maintained in order to en-
sure that future fields do not leak information. Nymix’s
structural approach to homogeneity offers a future proof
architecture that remains immunity to these types of at-
tacks.
On the other end of the spectrum, there has been con-
siderable work in using OS sandboxing to enhance isola-
tion and resistance to compromised browsers and appli-
cations, such as BOS [12], IBOS [69], and Atlantis [50].
These approaches separate each web page instance into
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unique processes that have access to a limited API in-
tended for web browsing only. However, this work has
yet to address the need for pseudonymity and anonymity.
Similar efforts have been made to offer separation on
content in general and not just Web interaction [51], a
feature Nymix also seamlessly offers. Nymix currently
uses virtual machines to offer sandboxing, but architec-
turally Nymix could in principle sandboxing could be of-
fered by lightweight process-level sandboxes [51], soft-
ware fault isolation [72, 78], enhanced browser-based
sandboxes [69, 50, 34, 12], virtual machines [12], or even
hosting Nymix instances in the cloud [48].
Nymix could be extended in many directions. A nym
only isolates identities, but could benefit from approaches
that isolate and protect sensitive data in a browser, such
as Configurable Origin Policies [9], TaintDroid [21], and
Crypton-Kernel [16]. While Nymix might isolate a key
logger, ScreenPass [47] could offer Nymix a means to se-
cure password entry to avoid spoofing attacks by provid-
ing a trusted password entry keyboard.
7 Discussion and Future Work
The Enemy Within: The Nymix model depends on the
sterility of both hardware and software. A malicious party
could install malware into the hypervisor prior to distribu-
tion or in the firmware of WiFi devices prior to a party in
order to compromise a user’s anonymity. Using trusted
platform modules could potentially ensure the running
software and firmware; however, all is for naught if the
hardware vendor has conspired with the adversary.
Lack of Perfect Homogeneity: Even while using virtu-
alization and the same set of software, there still exists the
possibility for differences between users. An adversary
could execute a particularly CPU intensive application,
such as a Javascript application that computes a million
digits of PI, and use the timings to produce a fingerprint
for that user. Also, all users cannot necessarily be in the
same location, and hence if there is a single Tor user in
Tyrannistan, the government-owned ISP could easily de-
termine the responsible party for any Tyrannistani traffic
related to Tor.
Long Term Intersection Attacks: Nymix mitigates in-
tersection attacks by reducing a user’s fingerprint; how-
ever, a fingerprint can be developed even if the user em-
ploys amnesia simply by the set of websites he visits or
the accounts used on those sites. An adversary performs
an intersection attack [58] by tracking the online set of
participants and discovering a set of linkable, yet anony-
mous messages. The adversary constructs an intersection
of users that were online at the same time as those link-
able messages. With sufficiently many number of mes-
sages, the adversary will be able to discover the owner of
the linkable messages. To enhance Nymix’s ability to re-
sist intersection attacks, we plan to integrate Buddies [77].
Buddies offers users anonymity metrics and safe guards a
user from falling below a desirable anonymity threshold.
Concealing Network Identity: Network identity
proves difficult even in the Nymix context. Network
fingerprinting comes in many forms from operating
system interfaces to NIC devices [54], drivers [24],
MAC addresses, and even the hardware characteristics of
devices [7]. Some of these attacks are avoidable using
a common device with a standardized driver, a volatile
management framework for the device, and randomized
MAC addresses.
For well-equipped adversaries, this approach is insuffi-
cient. Brik et al. [7] determined that even devices from the
same manufacturer with sequential serial numbers could
be fingerprinted due to the errors in the signal. Since
we envision that Nymix may be used in moderately well-
organized groups, we posit that users could organize WiFi
device exchange parties, or WiFi social mixes, akin to
Richard Stallman’s “Charlie Card” swapping parties [64]
to elude RFID-based fingerprinting. During these parties,
each member would place their cards in a box. After
collecting all members’ cards, each member would ran-
domly select one without knowing which had been taken
and which were left. Users might have many such parallel
exchanges, so that a user could have several WiFi cards
at a time. In addition, individuals could use an active an-
tenna to ambiguate their location as well also to change
the physical properties of the device’s transmissions.
8 Conclusion
Nymix offers novel structural solutions for managing on-
line identities or pseudonyms. In contrast to existing sys-
tem solutions for anonymity and pseudonymity, Nymix
provides completely independent state for each of the
user’s identities. Nymix, however, does not subsume or
replace the need for other techniques or hardened systems.
We believe Nymix offers a useful platform for researching
Web browsing pseudonymity that should eventually be in-
corporated into Tails and similarly hardened systems.
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